Sacred documents in the pious Tibetan world are generally treated
with great reverence – placed on the head, wrapped in silk, fumigated
with incense smoke – but perhaps not read or discussed as much as they
should be. To save the Great
Thirteenth’s Declaration of Independence (which we will be
commemorating in a few days) from such an ignominious fate, I am
providing the background story, as it were, of the events and
personalities that contributed to the creation of an independent Tibet
in 1912/13. This essay is not too long (by my standards) and as simple
and straightforward as I could make it. It is my hope that it will stir
enough discussion so that by the 13th of February we will have gained a
dynamic new understanding of this revolutionary document and an
appreciation of those memorable people who struggled for its
realization. JNThe second half of the 19th century witnessed a nationalist awakening among Asian nations, inspired in some part by the
Meiji Ishin,
the dramatic and revolutionary modernization of a formerly feudal and
xenophobic Japan. Imperial China followed, perhaps less successfully,
with the
Tzu-ch’iang yün tung or the Self-Strengthening Movement
(1861–1895), a program of institutional reforms initiated during the
late Qing Dynasty following a series of military defeats and concessions
to foreign powers. Around the same time in India a profound social and
intellectual awakening took place within educated Indian society.
Referred to as the Bengal Renaissance, this movement can be seen as a
precursor to India’s independence struggle and by extension its
remarkable present day economic success.
Tibet’s first encounter
with British colonial power, in the form of the East India Company, had
taken place a century earlier, but it was in the second half of the 19th
century, with British annexation of Darjeeling and its gradual takeover
of Sikkim, that an assertive, even aggressive “nationalistic” spirit
manifested itself in the Tibetan response to British colonial advances
and Imperial Chinese machinations in Tibet.
An ostensibly
innocuous diplomatic agreement led to the unfolding of these events and
the first military conflict between Tibet and Britain. In 1876 Great
Britain and Imperial China signed the Chefoo convention, one article of
which permitted the British to send an exploratory mission through
Tibet. It might be noted that China regards this convention as one of
the “unequal treaties” imposed on it by the West.
In the years
following the signing of the treaty the British kept busy preparing the
way for the hoped for Tibet trade. In 1879 a cart road to the Jelep La
Pass into the Chumbi Valley was completed, bringing Darjeeling into easy
reach of the Tibetan border. In 1881 a branch railway line from
Darjeeling to Siliguri was also completed.
But since Tibet had
not been consulted, the “Tibetan parliament” or the Tsongdu the National
Assembly refused to allow the British mission entry to Tibet. According
to Alastair Lamb “… the Chinese chose to rebuke the Tibetans for their
opposition to a mission which the Emperor had authorized; and as a
gesture of defiance to the Chinese, the Tibetans (eventually) closed the
passes from Chumbi to Sikkim and reinforced Lingtu.”[1]
Artist's impression of Tibetans attacking at Lungthur
In this act of defiance to Britain and China,
Tibetans erected a fortification at Lingtu (or rather “Lungthur”[2]
(sloping land) according to Shakabpa) thirteen miles into what the
British regarded as Sikkim territory. To demonstrate their resolve the
Tibetans garrisoned the fort with nine hundred soldiers. According to L.
A. Waddell the Tibetans actually invaded Sikkim “and advanced to within
sixty miles of Darjeeling, causing a panic in that European
sanitarium.”[3] The British sent two thousand soldiers and artillery
under Brigadier Graham to expel the Tibetans. Artillery bombardment and
infantry charges finally drove Tibetans back from Lungthur. “But the
Tibetans, despite their primitive equipment…” Lamb tells us “…were not
dismayed by this show of force.
In May they attempted a surprise attack on the British camp at Gnatong (nak-thang
or black meadow) and nearly succeeded in capturing the
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who was visiting the frontier; they were
repulsed with severe losses.”[4] Waddell also mentions that the Tibetans
fought fiercely and showed “great courage and determination.” Waddell
acknowledges that an additional cause for the Tibetan “invasion” might
have been the British annexation of Sikkim, which the Tibetans regarded
as legitimately in their sphere of influence. In spite of the major
setback at Lungthur the Tibetans stubbornly refused to acknowledge
Britain’s right to send a mission to Tibet, nor China’s right to grant
permission for such a venture.
Tibetan intransigence brought the
British around to the conclusion that it was perhaps wisest for it
sacrifice the “problematical gains in Tibet” especially “the exploratory
mission to Tibet” it had obtained at Chefoo, since by not challenging
China’s position in Tibet, Britain secured China’s recognition of its
rule in Burma, (the Burmah-Tibet Convention of 1886). Earlier, China had
regarded Burma as its own tributary state but Britain had, in three
successive wars, fully taken over the country by 1885. China’s formal
recognition of British rule in Burma, gained for the Manchu court
Britain’s reciprocal recognition of China’s claim of suzerainty over
Tibet.
A government publication (Sikhim Gazetter) gives a
clear picture of the official British view of Tibet at the time. “Who
will deny that it would be a piece of surpassing folly to alienate a
possible ally in China by forcing our way into Tibet in the interests of
scientific curiosity, doubtfully backed by mercantile speculation.”[5]
Alastair Lamb adds “It was in this frame of mind that the Indian
government hoped to settle the future relations between British India
and China without reference to the Tibetans.”[6]
Sino-British conference at Darjeeling
Tibetans were kept out of all the conventions and
discussions that took place in those years between the British and the
Chinese concerning Tibet or Sikkim. In 1893 when the Trade Regulation
talks (to be appended to the Sikkim-Tibet convention) were being held in
Darjeeling, the Tibetan cabinet sent a senior official, Paljor Dorje
Shatra to keep and eye on the proceedings. Shatra’s presence appears to
have been resented by the British and he was “permitted to suffer an
insult” (Lamb). What is known is that a number of British officers
dragged him off his horse and threw him into a public fountain in the
Chowrasta square. Another account says that Shatra’s servant was the
victim. The incident has been represented in some accounts as an
unfortunate prank by high-spirited subalterns. Lamb appears to believe
that the incident did actually happen and provides a few differing
versions.[7]
Tibetan defiance of Britain and China has in most
studies to date been downplayed as stemming from superstition and
ignorance, specifically as the outburst of Tibetan fears, fanned by
fanatical monks, that the British would destroy their religion. What has
not been seriously considered is that that this resistance could
perhaps have arisen from a spirit of Tibetan nationalism or patriotism.
Therefore
it might be worthwhile to note the contents of the talks that two
British officials, Nolan and Claude White, had at Yatung in November of
1895 with a Tibetan monk official (tsedrung) Tenzin Wangpo, after
it was discovered that the Tibetans had knocked down and destroyed a
number of British boundary pillars on the Sikkim border and again
established an armed outpost at Giaogong, which the British regarded as
being inside Sikkim territory. Alastair Lamb writes that “Nolan
concluded from his talks with Tenzing Wangpu (Tenzin Wangpo) that the
Tibetan outpost at Giagong symbolised a spirit of Tibetan nationalism,
greatly reinforced by the recent coming of age of the 13th Dalai Lama.
The Tibetans, Tenzing Wangpu said, did not feel bound by a treaty which
had been negotiated on their behalf by Britain and China and they would
not discuss the frontier as defined in that treaty. They were willing,
however, to discuss the frontier with reference to Tibetan maps; but
Tenzing Wangpu emphasized that ‘Tibet would not give up land merely
because required to by the Convention.’”[8]
That Tibetans
actually had their own maps of the frontier was a fact known to the
British. H.H. Risely mentions “a very remarkable map” belonging to “a
Tibetan General and Secretary of State”. The map showed “the tract of
country extending from Phari to Darjeeling.” Risely also notes that, “As
a political manifesto, the map is of peculiar interest at the present
time; and one is disposed to wonder that our barbarous neighbours should
have been so ready to adopt one of the characteristic weapons of modern
diplomacy.”[9]
Another Tibetan map, this one the whole of
Sikkim, according to Phillmore, appears to have been “made by the Tibet
army for the Tibet-Sikkim war of I887; a very fine pictorial map mostly
in brilliant blue … with no suggestion of Western influence. Our own
maps of Sikkim at that time had the scantiest of information, but we
have no record as to the extent to which they benefited from the
acquisition of the Tibet map.”[10] This is probably not the same map as
the one discussed earlier since Risely mentions that the colours used on
his map were yellow and red. Wadell also mentions the latter map “A
curious map of Sikhim and Darjeeling was also picked up, and a
lithograph of it is now displayed in the Survey Office in Calcutta.”[11]
Lonchen Shatra Paljor Dorje
L.A. Waddell who was living in Darjeeling around this period had a number of conversations with the Tibetan minister Shatra sha-pe.
It was probably from him he learned of a new spirit of nationalism that
had arisen in Tibet due to public resentment at the collusion of the
Demo regent with the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa. Patriotic officials
believed that the two parties were plotting against the young 13th Dalai
Lama, and they feared that he might suffer the fate of the last four
Dalai Lamas who died very young in “a mysterious manner” to the
advantage of the Chinese Ambans and the regents. Waddell concluded that:
“The
present Dalai Lama has been permitted to become an exception to this
rule, through the influence of the national party which has risen up in
Tibet in veiled revolt against the excessive interference by the Chinese
in the government of the country. This national party saved the young
Dalai from the tragic fate of his predecessors, and they rescued him and
the Government out of Chinese leading-strings by a dramatic coup d’ etat.” [12]
Waddell
was impressed by Shatra and felt that by not recognizing him “in a way
befitting his high rank” and by excluding him from the official
discussions the British had “missed an excellent opportunity” to gain
Tibetan trust. Waddell found Shatra “a most refined and well-informed
gentleman, and well disposed towards the British. Shatra told Waddell
that he had wasted his time in Darjeeling but that he would like to take
back to Lhasa a summary of British “criminal, police and civil codes”,
which had much impressed him. He desired to reform the legal system in
Tibet (many features of it imposed by the Manchus) that followed such
Chinese practices as torturing suspects until they confessed to their
crimes, which the young minister found objectionable.
It should
be noted that Tibetan defiance of British and Chinese imperial ambitions
was consistently maintained for nearly three decades. In fact till 1904
and the signing of the Lhasa convention, Tibet’s aggressive
nationalistic, anti-British policy did not change.
British artillery firing on Tibetans
The British invasion force with its repeating rifles,
maxim heavy machine guns and (according to Tibetans) unalloyed
treachery, massacred seven hundred Tibetan country levees at Chumi
Shengo, in the space of a couple of hours. “Despite this withering
attack, the Tibetan forces fell back in good order, refusing to turn
their backs or run, and holding off cavalry pursuit at bayonet
point”[13]. A couple of thousand more Tibetans died for their
“fatherland” (phayul) in subsequent battles at Samada, Gangmar,
Neyning, Zamdang, and most significantly at Gyangtse, where the Tibetans
actually besieged the British force for a time before the conflict
ended and the British marched into Lhasa and forced a treaty on the
government in August 1904.
Tibetans can legitimately view the
events from 1876 to 1904 as the first chapter in their modern history.
Most accounts of this period, largely written by British officials or
scholars tend to downplay native resistance and patriotism and ascribe
them instead to Tibetan religious fanaticism.
There has never
been a study of the origins of modern Tibetan nationalism or national
identity stemming from this period, nor a review of the factors that
could have caused or influenced it. Something like this is long overdue.
I offer a few speculations of mine on the origins of these developments
in modern Tibetan history.
It is possible that the 13th Dalai
Lama and his officials were influenced by the spirit of modernization,
social reform and nationalism that was beginning to spread throughout
Asia towards the end of the 19th century as I mentioned at the beginning
of this paper. We know that the young 13th Dalai Lama was interested,
even fascinated by Meiji Japan. Considering his own problems with the
Manchu court, China’s crushing defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of
1894 must have piqued his interest. He sent a notable scholar, the geshe,
Tsawa Tritul and two other Tibetans to study in Japan, long before he
sent the four Tibetan boys to study at Rugby. When His Holiness was in
Peking in 1908, he arranged to visit Japan, but had to cut his plans
short because of the death of the Manchu Emperor. Bell also mentions how
His Holiness was impressed by Japanese defeat of China in 1894, and
also that he sent his commander in chief, Tsarong to Japan.[14] Bell
mentions that in his meetings with the Dalai Lama “… his thoughts turn
often to Japan. He continually asks me for new of Sino-Japanese
relations.”[15].
When Sir Charles Bell wrote that he was “the
first European who had visited Lhasa at the invitation of the people
themselves”[16] he was probably unaware that the Dalai Lama had earlier
invited two Japanese, Tada Togan and Aoki Bunkyo to visit and stay in
Lhasa. Tada, a religious scholar, studied in Lhasa for ten years, while
Aoki translated military manuals, and Japanese textbooks and books on
education in general that he obtained from Fujitani in Calcutta. He was
also “principal advisor on foreign affairs” providing His Holiness with a
“news bulletin summarized from Japanese press despatches and English
newspapers. Another Japanese, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, and
an instructor at a military college at Tokyo, Yasujiro Yajima, was put
in charge of training the largest unit of the new Tibetan Army. This was
before the British system was introduced. On the death of the emperor
Meiji on 30 July 1912 the Dalai Lama sent a message of condolence to
Japan. According to a leading writer on Japan-Tibet relations, “He (the
13th Dalai Lama) had admired what the emperor had stood for as the
progressive leader of an independent Asian Buddhist nation.”[17]
But
behind the young and, might we say “nationalist” Dalai Lama there were a
number of loyal, capable, even relatively progressive officials who
formed the “National party” that Waddell describes as having saved His
Holiness from the machinations of the Demo Regent and the Chinese Amban.
The foremost member of this unique company was certainly the Lonchen
Shatra, Paljor Dorje, intelligent, sophisticated, meticulous, “ever the
trained diplomatist”, according to Sir Henry MacMahon. The British
initially regarded him with deep suspicion. According to Shakabpa he was
suspected of being in the pay of the Russians.[18] On the other hand,
because of his appreciation of British military and economic power,
gained by his visits to Darjeeling, and his sage advice to the Tibetan
government to avoid confrontation with the British, he was regarded by
the National Assembly as having sold out to the British. Though his
cabinet colleagues, Zholgang, Chankyim and Horkhang loyally stood by
him, the allegations raised by the National Assembly and not-so-subtle
innuendoes (in verse) by the Nechung oracle, caused the detention of the
four ministers at Norbulingka.[19]
Hastings
House Calcutta 1910. Seated from left: Prince of Derge Ngawang Jampel,
Crown prince of Sikkim Sikyong Tulku, Charles Bell, 13th Dalai Lama,
Lonchen Shatra, Lonchen Zholgang, Lonchen Chankyim and Kalon Tenzin
Wangpo. Standing from left S.W Laden la, Tashi Wangdi, unknown,
physician Ngoshi Jhampa Thubwang, unknown, unknown, Diwan Bahadur Phala.
Subsequent events not only exonerated these officials
but required the Dalai Lama to have them by his side in his flight to
Darjeeling. In this British hill-station, Lonchen Zholgang undertook and
completed a history of Tibet, the manuscript of which has unfortunately
been lost.[20] And this was not the only bit of writing that seems to
have come out of the Dalai Lama’s court in Darjeeling. One might
speculate that this modest intellectual and literary stirring could have
been inspired, even if in a peripheral way, by the Bengal Renaissance.
After all Darjeeling was the summer capital of Bengal government. His
Holiness’s senior secretary Shelkar Lingpa wrote the 46 stanza poem A Song of Lhasa Memories[21], which is even now read with admiration and pleasure by many Tibetans. A deputy cabinet minister (Gungthang katsap) Tenzin Wangpo penned a biographical account of the Dalai Lamas, which Sarat Chandra Das later incorporated in his Introduction to the Grammer of the Tibetan Language.
The Dalai Lama himself and his personal physician, Ngoshi Jampa
Thupwang, seem to have studied the public health situation in Darjeeing
and the Indian Medical Service, for after the 13th’s return to Lhasa,
Bell tells us that “…the Tibetan government has established a meat
market (in Lhasa) where meat is sold under more sanitary conditions…”
[22] Of more significance is the establishment of the new Mentzi Khang,
the Medical and Astrological School and Centre, and the creation of the
“Chipa Nyerchoe” or the program to provide medical assistance to all
Tibetan children, especially newborns. Ngoshi was appointed the chief
physician and administrator of Mentzikhang with the title of khenchen, and Khenrab Norbu as his assistant with the title of khenchung or junior abbot.[23]
Another
official in His Holiness’s court at Darjeeling, Tashi Wangdi, who had
previously been in the service of the Amban, contributed a very useful
dictionary/word-book in Tibetan, English, Chinese and Hindi, that
especially featured new words of political, technical and scientific
nature. The book had been published just a year earlier at the Baptist
Mission Press in Calcutta and no doubt proved useful to His Holiness and
his officials, seeking to learn about the new world they had been
rudely forced into.
Other Tibetan nationalist figures as Tsarong
Dasang Damdul, Jampa Tendar (later Kalon Lama), Trimon are well known
and do not require discussion.
But one of the most important
personalities of this period, and one who might even be considered the
seminal figure in bringing about the reformist and nationalist awakening
in the court of the young Dalai Lama, has by and large been overlooked.
Agvan Dorjief
The Buriat lama, Agvan Dorjiev’s vital role in modern
Tibetan history has thus far not been sufficiently acknowledged, thanks
in large part to British reports and accounts, which invariably
relegate him to the role of a sinister Russian spy. He first came to
Lhasa in 1873, to study at Drepung monastery where he obtained his geshe
degree. Dorjiev, whose Tibetan name was Ngawang Lobsang, must have been
an extraordinarily gifted scholar since he became one of the seven tsenshabs or
debating partners of the young Dalai Lama. In 1888 he became a
confidant and tutor to the Dalai Lama and for the next ten years served
as his “inseparable attendant”. In turn His Holiness looked upon him as
his “true guardian and protector”.[24]
The young Dalai Lama may
have had virtually no knowledge of the outside world or of the workings
of international politics, but his tutor, according to Dorjiev
biographer John Snelling, “… was very much a man of the world:
comparatively well-educated, well traveled In Central Asia, and moreover
a person of intelligence, acumen, charm and character.” One European
witness who met him at the time testifies that his ‘science, energy and,
and above all, the vivacity of his mind … predestined him to become a
great statesmen or a great adventurer.”[25]
Dorjiev’s “modern,
progressive turn of mind” gained from his extensive travels. He visited
St. Petersburg as the Dalai Lama’s envoy, and also Paris, London, and
major cities in India and China. He was in the thick of the politics of
the period, facing not only the opposition of the powerful
ultra-conservative clique in Lhasa but also the hostility of the
British. It is now generally accepted that he was no foreign spy but a
patriot who strove tirelessly and openly to create a Mongolian and
Tibetan nation independent of China. It might be mentioned here that
Dorjiev was the one of the main authors of the Tibet Mongolia Treaty
(and signatory for Tibet) which was signed on 29th of December 1912.
The principal purpose of the treaty appears to be demonstrate the
complete independence of Tibet and Mongolia, and declare their rejection
of Manchu rule and political ties to China.
This is not the
place for a detailed discussion of this enigmatic personality, but it
should be said that his was a significant role in shaping the young
Dalai Lama’s independent and progressive views – and hence in shaping
the history of modern Tibet. John Snelling mentions that in a discussion
with the “eminent historian of Central Asia”, Alastair Lamb, he was
told that “… if Dorjiev had not appeared when he did, the course of
Tibetan history would indeed have been very different.”
Finally,
we should perhaps not discount the possibility of Tibet’s “nationalist”
spirit being awakened by examples from within its own past. For
instance, the Phagmodrupa king, after overthrowing Mongol rule in Tibet
(ten years before the Chinese overthrew the Mongol Yuan dynasty)
consciously attempted to create a new non-Mongol national identity
reflecting the early Imperial period of Tibetan history. The harsh
Mongol penal code was rejected and laws derived in part from the
imperial period, adopted. The Phagmodrupa revived ancient customs and
“during the New Year celebration high officials had to wear the costumes
of the early kings.”[26] The second Phagmodrupa king sponsored
Tsongkhapa’s Monlam festival in Lhasa, which became the largest festival
in the Tibetan calendar and attracted thousands of pilgrims and
worshippers from all over the country and beyond. Although the Monlam is
a great religious festival, it also has important historical and
military aspects, presented in grand and colorful pageants and parades
that serve to inculcate in the Tibetan public a sense of its history and
identity.
It is my hope that these cursory speculations I have
shared with you today will instigate scholars and experts to undertake a
more extensive study of this important and fascinating period of
Tibetan history which has for long been misunderstood, and sometimes
even misrepresented.
This essay is based on a paper presented
at the 12th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan
Studies, Vancouver, B.C. (15th-21st August 2010), entitled “The Origins
of Modern Tibetan Nationalism, Some Speculations”
The
views expressed in this piece are that of the author and the publication
of the piece on this website does not necessarily reflect their
endorsement by the website.
[1]. Lamb, Alastair. Britain and
Chinese Central Asia, The Road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905, Routledge and
Keegan Paul, London, 1960. p 180
[2]. Shakabpa W.D. Bhod kyi sred
don rgyal rabs Political History of Tibet Vol II, Sherig Parkhang
(TCRPC), Dharamshala, 2002, p 89
[3]. Waddell, L.A. Lhasa and its Mysteries, Methuen London, 1905. pp 48-49
[4]. Lamb, . p 186.
[5] Riseley, H.H. (ed.). Gazetteer of Sikhim. Calcutta1894, D.K. Publishers, New Delhi, 1999, pg xii and xiii
[6]. Lamb, p 203
[7]. ibid., pp203-204
[8]. Lamb, p 215
[9] Risely, p viii and ix.
[10] Phillimore, R. H. “Early East Indian Maps” Imago Mundi, Vol. 7 (1950), pp. 73-74 Published by: Imago Mundi, Ltd.
[11]. Waddell, L.A. Among the Himalayas, westminister: Archibald Constable & Co. , London. 1900. p 269.
[12] . Waddell, Lhasa and its Mysteries pp 48-49
[13]. Anon, British Expedition to Tibet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_expedition_to_Tibet
[14]. Bell, Charles. Tibet Past and Present, Oxford, 1924.
[15]. Bell, Charles. Portrait of the Dalai Lama, Collins, London 1946. P 349
[16]. Ibid. p 253
[17] . Berry, Scott, Monks, Spies and a Soldier of Fortune: The Japanese in Tibet, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995.
[18] Shakabpa p110
[19]. Ibid.106
[20]
Tashi Tsering la, director of Amnye Machen Institute provided me with
this information, and with the information on the Tenzin Wangpo’s
History of the Dalai Lamas and Tashi Wangdi’s dictionary.
[21] Shekarlingpa H.E., A Song of Lhasa Memories & A Poem in Alphabetical Order, Tibet Mirror Press, Kalimpong 1965.
[22] Bell, Charles. The People of Tibet, Oxford, 1928. p 220
[23] Shakabpa, p 248.
[24] . Markov.S., ‘Tibetskye Chetki” (“Tibetan rosary”). P 101, Prostor (Alma-Ata), No 1, 1976.
[25]. Ular Alexander, ‘The Policy of the Dalai Lama’, pg 42-43. Contemporary Review, No 87, January-June 1905
[26]. Shakabpa, Tsepon W.D. Tibet: A Political History, Yale University Press, 1967.
